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I. Introduction
The efficient market paradigm, coupled with modern portfolio theory, has brought a huge increase in index products to securities markets. For instance, by year-end 2008, assets in ETFs and index mutual funds exceeded $1.1 trillion-growing about tenfold over the past decade, and accounting for almost 12 percent of all mutual fund assets. 1 In some sectors, passive investing has a much bigger presence. For instance, among large-blend domestic equity funds, passively managed money accounts for 40 percent of all assets. While some studies have documented that passive funds demand significant liquidity, little empirical research has been conducted to directly examine the impact of this increased passive management on the efficiency of stock prices.
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Some useful insights can be drawn from a comparison of passive funds to the "noise traders" of microstructure models (e.g., Kyle, 1985) ). Similar to noise traders, passive funds reflect the decisions of (mainly) individual investors, who do not usually possess superior information about the stocks in which they invest. The seminal paper by Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) describes an equilibrium that requires trading by informed (active) investors
for the efficient transmission of costly information to stock prices. Their model would predict that an "excess" fraction of uninformed (passive) traders would result in inefficient stock markets, with mispricings significant enough to attract further active traders. On the other hand, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) show how an excess of active traders could result in a market breakdown, which could lead to inefficient price discovery.
Passive funds and noise traders are also distinct in important ways. One such difference is in their liquidity provision roles. Noise trades take place randomly across stocks, as well as over time. In models of market structure, such as Kyle (1985) , noise traders provide liquidity to the market by pooling with informed traders. That is, market makers can set Carino and Pritamani (2007) document a significant price-pressure effect when the Russell 2000 stock index is reconstituted, presumably from the demand for liquidity by index funds. Further, Goetzmann and Massa (2003) find a price impact of the daily flows of three Fidelity index funds. Also, using institutional transactions data, Keim and Madhavan (1997) and Jones and Lipson (1999, 2001) document that, at short horizons, index funds generate a larger price impact when they trade, relative to active funds.
prices to offset their losses to informed traders with profits from uninformed traders, thus, market makers are willing to trade when they do not know whether their counter-party is informed or not. Index funds, however, tend to trade in the same direction at the same time, as well as trading in a persistent direction over time, due to the persistent flows from investors. In addition, index funds trade to accommodate index reconstitutions in a correlated manner. As a consequence, index funds may generate a larger and longer-lasting price impact than typical noise traders. This gives rise to the question of whether index funds are much of a liquidity provider to the market, and, in particular, to active funds. Perhaps index funds sometimes increase liquidity by pooling with active funds, and, at other times decrease liquidity through their impatient and correlated trades. In turn, as shown by Da, Gao, and Jagannathan (2010), actively managed funds can be liquidity-absorbing impatient traders or liquidity suppliers, depending on the relative profits of these two competing trade motivations.
In this paper, we empirically investigate the relation between passive and active institutional trading and stock price efficiency. Following the predictions of the aforementioned papers, we conjecture the following "causal effect" of the presence of passive vs. active institutional investors: stocks with "too many" passive investors should have a greater level of persistent mispricing, such as momentum-(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) or accrualbased (Sloan, 1996) stock anomalies (due to the influence of flows from individuals with predictable behavioral investing patterns) that are not adequately arbitraged by active institutional traders. 3 On the other hand, stocks having too many active investors may exhibit short-term illiquidity, as active traders must wait longer for uninformed investors with which to pool their trades.
Complicating our analysis is the presence of a "preference effect", which is also based on the aforementioned papers. That is, although uninformed (passive) investors add noise to stock prices, they are, by nature, attracted to stocks whose prices are informationally efficient. On the other hand, when stock prices become noisy due to the presence of un-informed traders, active investors have a strong incentive to acquire information and trade stocks. Therefore, passive investing is associated with higher liquidity by preference, and active funds may have a similar preference in order to strategically pool with the uninformed, as modeled by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) .
Our study investigates the effect of active and passive fund holdings and trades using mutual fund holdings during the period from 1993 to 2006. Our analysis compares the liquidity and price efficiency of stocks held and traded by passive funds and active funds using these holdings data. To facilitate our analysis, we construct measures of stock-level passiveness, based on total shares owned, total shares traded, and net trading (buys minus sells) of a given stock by all passive funds. We also construct similar stock-level activeness measures, based on holdings and trades by all active funds.
Our analysis shows that active and passive funds hold and trade similar stocks. Specifically, equity holdings of passive funds exhibit a strong positive cross-sectional correlation with equity holdings of active funds, controlling for stock characteristics known to attract institutional investors in general (e.g., stock liquidity). Further, stocks traded more heavily by passive funds are also traded more heavily by active funds. These findings suggest that active funds purposely trade the same stocks as passive funds. It also suggests that the interaction between passive and active funds is important when assessing the relation of passive funds with liquidity and efficiency. Interestingly, the correlation between net purchases (buys minus sells) of a particular stock by passive funds and by active funds, although still significantly positive, has a much smaller magnitude. That is, while passive and active funds tend to trade the same stocks, their trades are often in different directions. This finding indicates that, while active funds often strategically choose to trade in the same direction in the same stocks as passive funds to hide their private information (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) , they also sometimes supply liquidity to passive funds, consistent with Da, Gao, and Jagannathan (2010).
Stock price efficiency is multi-faceted, and existing studies have analyzed this issue in multiple dimensions. To provide a relatively comprehensive perspective, we measure price efficiency in terms of liquidity, price impact, price informativeness, and magnitude of longterm systematic mispricing (i.e., stock "anomalies"). That is, we measure price efficiency at high and low frequencies. We find that, first, there is a strong positive relation between active-fund presence and stock liquidity. The relation between passive fund presence and stock liquidity is also positive, but not as strong as that for active funds in terms of magnitude in a model that includes both passive and active fund holdings of a stock. Recall that the "preference effect" predicts a positive correlation between passiveness and liquidity, while the "causality effect" suggests a negative relation. The results therefore suggest that the preference effect dominates, in a way consistent with the equilibrium predictions mentioned earlier.
We also find evidence of synchronized trading and a large price impact by passive funds. Both are consistent with the theoretical equilibrium predictions, which is that passive funds prefer stocks with a high degree of informational efficiency. 4 We also find that active funds tend to hold and trade stocks with a lower R 2 and higher PIN; the former suggests the causal effect that active funds improve efficiency by impounding firm-specific information into stock prices, while the latter suggests a preference effect-active funds pursue stocks with rich private information, and their presence might be the reason for the high PIN of some stocks.
Finally, we quantify the informational role of passive funds by examining their impact on the cross-sectional return predictive power of a large set of stock characteristics that have been shown to predict returns by past research. These predictors are combined into eight variables, including value, investment and financing activities, earnings quality, intangible investments, price and earnings momentum, information uncertainty, profitability, and liquidity. We find that the presence of active funds in stocks tends to reduce the predictive power of these variables. By contrast, the presence of passive funds tends to increase their predictive power. To the extent that such stock return predictability reflects market mispricing rather than a risk-return trade-off, this can be interpreted as evidence that active funds enhance, while passive funds reduce, the informational efficiency of stock prices. This finding is consistent with the equilibrium predictions of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
Our study shows how the coexistence of active and passive management in stocks affects price discovery. Active funds prefer to either trade together with passive funds-to hide the intentions of their trades from market-makers-or to trade against active funds to supply liquidity. In either case, active funds are mostly drawn to the same stocks as passive funds.
In turn, active funds increase the price efficiency of stocks by arbitraging mispricings. When passive funds dominate the holdings or trades of a given stock, relative to active funds, price discovery in that stock is hindered. Thus, a balance of active and passive funds is necessary for the price discovery process.
Our paper is related to Boehmer and Kelley (2007) , who find that stocks with greater institutional ownership are priced more efficiently in the sense that their high-frequency transaction prices more closely follow a random walk. In addition, Shu (2007) finds that low-frequency pricing anomalies, such as price momentum, post-earnings announcement drift, 4 There is a different interpretation on the PIN results. Some would argue that a low PIN indicates price inefficiency; see, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007) . and the value premium, are mitigated in stocks with a higher fraction of institutional traders.
Our paper is the first to show the separate and joint effects of active and passive funds on stock price efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes mutual fund sample and empirical methodology for identifying passive funds. Section III examines the effect of passive investing on stock liquidity and price impact. Section IV analyzes the effect of passive investing on price informativeness and magnitude of systematic mispricing. Section V concludes.
II. Data and Methodology

II.A. Data Sources
Data on mutual fund portfolio holdings are from Thomson Reuters. Data on fund returns and fund characteristics such as expense ratio and turnover are from CRSP. These two datasets are merged together via MFLINKs, which is obtained from WRDS (Wharton Research Data Service). We additionally obtain stock pricing data from CRSP and data on financial statements from COMPUSTAT. Analyst forecast data are from IBES.
II.B. Passive Fund Identification
Thomson Reuters and CRSP do not provide direct information on whether a mutual fund is an index fund or active fund. The MFLINKS dataset provides an index fund indicator.
However, we find that there are still many apparent index funds not classified as such by this indicator. Many index funds have names that contain identifiable words such as "index" and "S&P 500". However, some index funds do not have informative names. In addition, there are many "closet indexers". These are mutual funds that claim to be active funds, but actually behave quite similarly to index funds when forming portfolios.
We take two approaches to identify passive funds. In the first approach, we take all index funds identified via the MFLINKS index fund indicator, then add index funds manually identified based on suggestive fund names.
In the second approach, we attempt to include index funds with non-informative names and "closet indexers" based on several fund characteristics. The fund characteristics we consider include 1) annual turnover, 2) expense ratio, 3) R-square from regressing past 12-month fund returns in excess of the riskfree rate onto the Fama-French three factors (i.e., MKTRF, SMB, and HML), 4) the absolute value of estimated fund alpha from the same regression, 5) Herfindahl index of portfolio weights, and 6) Herfindahl index of portfolio weight changes. 5 In each quarter, we first estimate a Probit model, where the dependent variable equals one for index funds identified by the first approach, onto these fund characteristics. Then, we classify funds in the highest quartile in terms of the fitted probability, together with those index funds identified by the first approach, as passive funds. 6 Unlike the permanent index fund identification in the first approach, the identity of passive funds from the second approach may change from quarter to quarter, depending on the variations of fund characteristics.
We select a large sample of U.S. domestic equity funds based on the Thomson data. We prior to this year.
The above procedure leaves us 2,405 unique funds altogether, among which 187 are identified as index funds via the first approach. In Table I , we provide year-by-year statistics 5 The Herfindahl index for portfolio weights is a measure of portfolio concentration:
where w is the portfolio weight and N is the number of stocks held by the fund. The Herfindahl index for portfolio weight changes is similarly measured, by replacing w it with ∆w it , the weight change during the six-month period ending at quarter t. 6 For funds with missing characteristics, we first use cross-sectional regressions to project these characteristics onto the remaining (observed) characteristics, and then replace the missing characteristics with fitted values. Finally, we compute the implied probability using the parameters estimated for the Probit model. This procedure is performed during each quarter. Note that a few index funds are excluded from our sample because their average equity value to total assets ratio is below 0.75 due to incomplete reporting of holdings. 
II.C. Stock Level Measures of Passiveness and Activeness
We use several measures to quantify how heavily a stock is held or traded by passive funds and active funds. ACTIVEHOLD is the total number of shares of a stock held by all active funds at the end of a calendar quarter, divided by total shares outstand at quarter-end.
PASSIVEHOLD is similarly calculated, for shares held by passive funds. ACTIVETRADE is the total number of shares bought plus total number of shares sold by all active funds during the six months ending at the current quarter-end, divided by total shares outstanding at the current quarter-end. PASSIVETRADE is similarly calculated, for the combined number of shares bought and sold by all passive funds. Finally, ACTIVEBUY is the net shares purchased -number of shares bought minus the number of shares sold by all active funds -during the past six months, divided by total shares outstanding at current quarter-end, while PASSIVEBUY is similarly calculated for the net purchases by all passive funds.
In this study, fund trades are computed over past six months instead of quarterly, for the reason that many funds report holdings semi-annually. 8 Further, a fund that reports semiannually may have holdings reported for the previous quarter but does not report holdings for the current quarter. In this case, we include its holdings and trades at the end of the previous quarter when calculating the above statistics for the current quarter.
Funds report holdings for their fiscal quarter-ends, which may not coincide with the calendar quarter-ends. We assume that the shares in fund holdings reported for their fiscal quarter-ends are valid for the immediate coming calendar quarter-ends, after adjusting for stock splits using the CRSP share adjustment factor. The number of shares traded are also split-adjusted to reflect the share basis of the current calendar quarter-end.
The stock sample analyzed in this study includes all stocks held by at least one fund in our sample, in a given quarter. For convenience we refer to this stock sample as "stocks held by funds." Within this sample, if there is no holding or trading by any group of funds (active or passive) during a quarter, we set the resulting stock-level passiveness or activeness measures to zero. Table 3 reports cross-sectional distribution of these stock level passiveness and activeness measures. The distribution statistics include the 5th and 95th percentile, 1st
and 3rd quartile, median, and standard deviation. These statistics are first calculated in each quarter, then averaged over time.
One clear pattern is that active funds hold and trade more shares than do passive funds. and 7.02%. This suggests a higher degree of homogeneity among passive funds in terms of their holdings and trades, than among active funds.
An issue arises when interpreting the results from analysis based on these activeness and passiveness measures. Due to possible incomplete identification of passive funds and incomplete reporting by some passive funds, the passiveness measures likely understate the fraction of shares held and traded by all passive funds in the stock market. Across stocks, the passiveness measures constructed using sample passive funds are likely to have a strong positive correlation with the "true" passiveness measures had we observe and correctly identify all passive funds. 9 Given potential incomplete reporting by active funds, the activeness measures may also be understated. The complication this causes can be illustrated via the following example. Suppose one wishes to measure funds' price impact, by regressing future stock returns onto net-purchase-based passiveness and activeness measures. Further, suppose that for every identified passive fund, there is another identical passive fund not observed in the data. As a result, the real coefficient for the passiveness measure after taking into account the unreported funds, should be only half of the estimated coefficient in the regression based on reported data. Therefore, while one can read sensibly from the signs of the coefficients, one may not be able to infer much by comparing the magnitude of the coefficients.
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Panel A of Table 4 reports the cross-sectional correlations between pairs of activeness and passiveness measures. We compute both Pearson correlations and Spearman rank correlations each quarter, and then average them over the sample period. In general, the correlations are significantly positive -between ACTIVEHOLD and PASSIVEHOLD, between ACTIVETRADE and PASSIVETRADE, and between ACTIVEBUY and PASSIVEBUY.
Some of the correlations are rather high. For example, the Spearman rank correlation between ACTIVEHOLD and PASSIVEHOLD is 0.46 under the Probit model for passive fund identification. This suggests that it is important to control for the effect of active funds when analyzing the effect of passive funds. On the other hand, the correlation between ACTIVEBUY and PASSIVEBUY, although statistically significant, becomes much lower in magnitude, compared to the other two pairs. This suggests that while passive and active funds cluster on the stock they trade, they don't agree very highly on the direction of their trades.
There could be several reasons for the high correlations in the holding and trading between passive and active funds. One apparent reason is that active funds, for the purpose of reducing tracking errors, would hold stocks that are members of the passive benchmarks. As a result, part of active fund portfolio holdings and their trades resemble passive funds. This particular cause of the correlation is perhaps not a concern when we examine the impact of active and passive funds separately on stock price efficiency. Another possible explanation is the strategic liquidity choice by active funds, in a way similar to how informed investors cluster their trades with large noise trades in the intraday trading pattern (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) . A third explanation is the efficiency preference by passive funds -stocks with strong active fund presence may be more efficiently priced, and thus attracting passive funds. All these reasons suggest that the interaction between passive and active funds may be important when examining the effects of these funds on market efficiency.
To see if liquidity fully drives the correlation between the two groups of funds, we perform a cross-sectional regression with activeness measures as dependent variables. The explanatory variables include the corresponding passiveness measures, and two measures of liquidity as control variables: log market cap, and cross-sectional rank of stock trading turnover.
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The time series averages of the regression coefficients are reported in Panel B of Table 4 .
For the passiveness and activeness measures, we use both their raw measures, and their cross-sectional percentile ranks in regressions. The result suggests that the relation between activeness and passiveness measures remain significantly positive even after controlling for liquidity. Although not tabulated, we also include a few other liquidity measures employed subsequently in this study and obtain similar results here. Therefore, liquidity is not the only reason for the clustering of holdings and trades of passive and active funds.
III. Empirical Analysis: Liquidity and Price Impact
The textbook definition of market efficiency is that that security prices fully reflect all available information (Fama 1970) . To make this definition operational for empirical analysis, researchers have used various measures to quantify efficiency. In this paper, we provide a relative comprehensive analysis on price efficiency from in the following four perspectives:
liquidity, price impact, price informativeness, and magnitude of systematic mispricing. They capture the multi-facet nature of stock price efficiency.
III.A. The Effect on Stock Liquidity
Stock liquidity can be viewed as a measure of efficiency, in the sense that the price of a more liquid stock is less swayed by temporarily demand-supply imbalance, thus reflecting more information about its fundamentals. We employ the following five measures of liquidity:
1) ILLIQ, the cross-sectional percentile rank of Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, 2) LDV, the latent dependent variable estimate of transaction cost, following Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), 3) SIZE, the log of market capitalization at the end of a quarter, 4) TURN, turnover ratio, measured by the monthly trading volume divided by total shares outstanding, averaged over a quarter, and 5) VR, the variance ratio between 5-day return and 1-day return.
We provide a detailed description on the construction of ILLIQ, LDV, and VR in Appendix A.
To gauge the relation between active/passive fund presence and stock liquidity, we perform the following Fama-MacBeth regressions:
where LIQ i,t+1 is one of the five liquidity variables, measured in quarter t+1 (using quartert liquidity measures yields similar results). The explanatory variables, while denoted as ACTIVEHOLD, PASSIVEHOLD, ACTIVETRADE, and PASSIVETRADE, are actually transformed version of these variables. Two forms of transformations are considered. In the first, we use the cross-sectional percentile rank of the variables as regressors. In the second, we divide the original variables by their cross-sectional standard deviations, before using them as regressors. The cross-sectional regressions are performed during each quarter, and we obtain their time series averages and corresponding t-statistics.
The results are shown in Table 5 . Across the different liquidity measures, across the holding-based and trade-based passiveness/activeness measures, and across the two different approaches for defining passive funds, the coefficients obtained from regressions are generally consistent with the following interpretation: both higher activeness and passiveness measures are associated with higher stock liquidity. For example, when ILLIQ is the liquidity measure (higher ILLIQ means lower liquidity), the coefficients for ACTIVEHOLD, PASSIVEHOLD, ACTIVETRADE, PASSIVETRADE are all significantly negative.
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As discussed earlier, due to incomplete reporting, it is difficult to compare the magnitude of the coefficients when the original passiveness and activeness measures are used as regressors. After the transformations, the magnitude of the coefficients are no longer dependent on the average magnitude of the passiveness and activeness measures. To some extent this makes it feasible to compare the magnitude of the coefficients. That is, the difference in the coefficients between the passiveness and activeness measures can be interpreted as the differential effect on liquidity caused by per unit of ranking change or per standard deviation change in the measures. For example, the coefficient for PASSIVEHOLD is always higher (less negative) than that for ACTIVEHOLD, in both panels and under both approaches for identifying passive funds. This suggests that passive funds' holding and trading has a weaker association with stock liquidity, relative to that of active funds, on the basis of per unit ranking change and per unit standard deviation change of the measures.
Recall that the coefficients are the net of two effects: a preference effect and a causal effect. The preference effect of active funds suggests a positive relation between active fund holding/trading and liquidity, while the causal effect suggests a negative relation as informed trading by active funds demands liquidity. The positive empirical relation indicates that the preference effect dominates. Passive funds also prefer holding and trading on liquid stocks.
Further, the causal effect of noise trading is to provide liquidity to the market. These two effects combined seem to suggest a stronger positive relation between passive fund presence and stock liquidity than that for active funds. However, the empirical result is to the opposite. One possible explanation is that despite a positive preference effect, passive funds has actually a negative causal effect on liquidity -their passive holding reduces liquidity and their trading demands liquidity.
The reason for this negative causal effect is that, as discussed earlier, passive funds are 12 The only exception is in Panel A, the coefficient for PASSIVEHOLD when the liquidity measure is TURN. It is negative, but statistically insignificant. different than noise traders in the conventional sense. First, since passive funds hold stocks with low frequency of trading, a high proportion of stocks held by passive funds means that shares available for trading in the market is low. Further, trades by noise traders are uncoordinated and often offset each other, but passive funds often trade in the same direction and at around the same time, because they tend to have similar response to index change, have similar re-balancing needs, and experience similar investment flows driven by investors' market expectations and sentiments. This means that index funds may not be much of a liquidity provider to the market, but rather demand liquidity when they trade.
In the following, we further analyze this issue, by looking at the synchronicity of trades and price impact of trades.
III.B. Trading Synchronicity and Price Impact
We construct two measures of trading synchronicity among passive funds and among active funds. The first, a dollar-based measure, is the dollar value of net purchases (purchasesale) on a stock during the six months prior to the current quarter end, divided by the total value of trades (purchase + sale), by all passive funds and by all active funds respectively.
The second, a trades-based measure, is the net number of funds purchasing a stock (number of purchasing funds -number of selling funds) divided by the total number of funds trading the stock. We calculate these two measures for each stock in each quarter, among passive funds and among active funds separately. We then calculate their averages across stocks in each quarter, and finally take the time series means. For both dollar-based and trades-based measures, a higher value indicates a higher degree that funds trade on the same direction.
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The results are reported in Table 6 . When passive funds are identified by the index fund indicator, the dollar-based synchronicity measure for passive funds is 0.81, and the trades-based synchronicity measure is 0.58. By comparison, both synchronicity measures for active funds are significantly lower, at 0.61 and 0.42, respectively. When passive funds are identified by the probit model, the dollar-based measure and trades-based measure are 0.71 and 0.50 for passive funds, respectively, significantly higher than those for active funds, at 13 Despite differences in the scaling factor, the dollar-based synchronicity measure is similar to the herding measure of Sias (2004) and the trades-based synchronicity measure is similar to the herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992).
0.63 and 0.43. These results is consistent with the notion that passive funds trade in a much more concerted way than active funds.
Concerted trading by passive funds has a potentially large impact on stock prices. We investigate this using the following Fama-MacBeth regressions:
where R i,t+k is stock return during quarter t+k. We look at the four quarters of returns after the current quarter, i.e., k=1, ...,4. Again, we transform the explanatory variables by using their cross-sectional percentile ranks and cross-sectionally standardized values. Control variables include stock return in current quarter(R i,t ), log market capitalization at current quarter-end (SIZE), and cross-sectional percentile rank of trading turnover during the current quarter (TURN), with NASDAQ stocks ranked separately from NYSE-AMEX stocks. The regression is performed quarterly and the time series averages of the estimated coefficients are reported in Table 7 .
The coefficient of ACTIVEBUY is initially positive for the stock return during quarter t+1, and turns negative for returns in the next three quarters, suggesting an initial continuation and subsequent reversal. The initial continuation could be due to information as well as delayed herding behavior by some investors. The subsequent reversal is consistent with the recent evidence on the impact of herding, e.g., Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2009). By contrast, the coefficient for PASSIVEBUY is significantly negative for quarter t+1. That is, stocks heavily purchased by passive funds experience strong and immediate return reversals.
Note that the coefficient remains mostly negative and in many cases significantly negative for quarter t+2 to t+4.
A few studies, such as Keim and Madhavan (1997) and Jones and Lipson (1999, 2001), have found that index funds generate large price impact at relatively short horizons. What is striking about our finding is that the price impact of passive funds is quite long-lastingthe negative impact on stock return is significant for several quarters. This indicates that excess trading by passive funds reduces price efficiency.
IV. Empirical Analysis: Price Informativeness and Return Predictability
We now turn to two other aspects of price efficiency. The first is based on measures of price informativeness that we adopt from the existing literature. In the second set of analysis, we examine whether passive fund presence has an impact on cross-sectional stock return predictability. Many forms of stock return predictability are considered anomalies or systematic patterns of mispricing, and stronger predictability is indicative of lower price efficiency.
Therefore, by examining the effect of passive/active funds on these anomalies, we can infer the relation between passive/active fund presence and stock price efficiency.
IV.A. Analysis based on Price Informativeness Measures
We consider two measures of price informativeness. The first is R2, the R-square obtained from regressing weekly stock returns onto weekly market returns. Morck, Yeung, and Yu The PIN is an annual measure -i.e., one observation per year for each stock. We therefore assign the same annual PIN value to the four quarters with the year.
To examine the link between passive fund presence and price informativeness, we per-form Fama-MacBeth regressions by regressing R2 or PIN onto activeness and passiveness measures, as well as a set of control variables that are related to stock liquidity. In Table   8 , we report the results when we use market capitalization and stock turnover as control variables.
14 When we use R2 as the price information measure, the coefficients for ACTIVEHOLD and ACTIVETRADE are always significantly negative. The coefficients for PASSIVEHOLD and PASSIVETRADE are also significantly negative. This suggests that holding and trading by both active funds and passive funds are positively related to information efficiency. It is not clear the association for passive funds is stronger or weaker than that for active funds, as the difference between the coefficients take both positive and negative signs, depending on model specifications.
When PIN is used as dependent variable, the coefficients for ACTIVEHOLD and AC-TIVETRADE are always significantly positive, suggesting that stocks pursued by active funds are more likely to have informed trading (perhaps by active funds themselves). The coefficients for PASSIVEHOLD and PASSIVETRADE, on the other hand, are almost always significantly negative, suggesting that there are less informed trades on these stocks.
How do we interpret the PIN-based results in terms of price informativeness? Some would argue that a higher PIN means a higher degree of private information incorporated into the stock price, hence higher price efficiency. Others would say that informed trades are attracted by less informed stock price, hence a negative relation between PIN and price informativeness. Their difference appears to be the difference between the preference effect and the causal effect.
IV.B. Analysis based on Stock Return Predictability
The literature has documented many market anomalies, or cross-sectional stock return predictability by firm specific characteristics. To the extent that these anomalies reflect mispricing with respect to publicly available information, stronger anomalies means lower price efficiency. Therefore, by examining whether passive/active fund presence alleviates or exac-erbates anomalies, we can infer the role of these funds in price efficiency.
We consider an extensive set of market anomalies -25 in total. In Appendix B, we provide detailed descriptions of each firm-specific variable associated with the anomalies.
While large in number, many variables are related to each other. Based on their nature, we further group them into eight categories: 1) value (VALUE), 2) investment and financing activities (INVFIN), 3) earnings quality (EQAL), 4) intangible investments (INTANG), 5) momentum (MOM), 6) information uncertainty (UNCERT), 7) profitability (PROF), and 8) liquidity (LIQ). We combine variables in each group by a simple average of their crosssectional percentile ranks, into 8 summary variables. The variables are signed so that they should be positively related to stock returns, according to existing literature. These eight variables are the focus of our analysis. The details for constructing these measures are also explained in Appendix B.
In Table 9 , we report the univariate Fama-MacBeth regression of stock returns during the next four quarters (Q1 to Q4) onto each of the eight predictive variables. Most variables exhibit predictive power on stock returns as indicated by the existing literature.
It is also noted that the predictive power of each variable varies across the four quarterly holding periods (Q1 to Q4). To obtain a summary measure of the return predictive power across all four quarters, we take an approach that is similar to the "overlapping portfolio" approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for the analysis of momentum portfolios. In the context of Fama-MacBeth regressions, the specific procedure is as follows. First, in each quarter, we perform the following four cross-sectional regressions:
for k=1, 2, 3, and 4. X i,t−k is the predictive variable in quarter t-k. That is, we predict stock returns during quarter t by the k-quarter-lagged predictive variable X. Second, we take the average of the coefficients b k (k=1, ..., 4), and compute its time series mean. The result is reported in the last column of Table 9 , referred to as the "JT-Average".
Most "JT-Average" coefficients are significant except two, for UNCERT and LIQ. The main reason for the insignificant result is the relative short sample period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) .
Nonetheless, we include them as return predictor, as we are interested in whether passive/active fund presence makes a difference in the predictive power of these variables.
To see the impact of passive and active fund presence on the return predictive power of these variables, we perform the following Fama-MacBeth regressions:
where k=1, ..., 4. X i,t is one of the eight firm-specific predictive variables. ACTIVE i,t is the one of the activeness measures and PASSIVE i,t is the corresponding passiveness measure.
SIZE and TURN are log market cap and stock turnover ranks, respectively. When LIQ is the dependent variable, we do not include SIZE or TURN as explanatory variable.
For the purpose of reporting brevity, we only compute the JT-average of the coefficients, that is, the average of b j,k (k=1, ...., 4). Further, the results on the "JT-Average" coefficients are by and large similar when the passiveness and activeness measures are based on holdings (e.g., PASSIVEHOLD) or based on trades (e.g., PASSIVETRADE). To save space we only tabulate the results for the holding-bases passiveness and activeness measures and when they are rank-transformed.
The results are in Table 10 . The patterns are as follows. First, the coefficients for the predictive variables are significant except for two (INTANG and LIQ). Second, a majority coefficients for the product term X*ACTIVE are negative, and a few are significantly negative. Third, most coefficients for X*PASSIVE are positive, with quite a few significantly positive. It is also worth-noting that although UNCERT and LIQ per se are not significant in predicting returns in univariate regressions (Table 9) , their interaction terms with activeness and passiveness are significant predictors.
Therefore, once we control for stock liquidity and for the respective effect on each other by active vs. passive funds, there is some evidence that the presence of active funds reduces stock return predictability, and even stronger evidence that the presence of passive funds exacerbates stock return predictability. This is consistent with the causal effect for both the passive funds and active funds.
V. Conclusions
This paper investigates the interaction in ownership and trading activity on individual stocks between active and passive mutual fund, and analyzes the resulting impact on the efficiency of stock prices. Our study finds that active funds are drawn to the same stocks as passive funds, and that active funds increase the price efficiency of stocks through their trades. We also find that stocks with high levels of passive fund ownership and trading exhibit more long-term pricing anomalies as well as a larger price reversal following trades. Our study is the first to analyze the separate as well as joint roles of active and passive fund ownership and trades of U.S. stocks. Our results suggest that further research should account for the mix of these two institutional types in studying the price discovery process as well as the tendency of stocks to exhibit pricing anomalies.
APPENDIX A: Stock Liquidity Measures
We investigate five measures of stock liquidity. Among the five, SIZE and TURN are readily explained in the main text. Below we provide details of the remaining three: ILLIQ, LDV, and VR.
A.1 ILLIQ
The Amihud illiquidity ratio (IR) is based on Amihud (2002) and is further used in Acharya and
Pedersen (2005). IR is computed as
where r ik is the return on stock i during day k of quarter t; dvol ik is the dollar volume traded in stock i during that day, and d t is the number of trading days in quarter t. We require stock i to be traded during at least 44 days during quarter t to compute A it . Note that a more illiquid stock will have a larger (absolutely value of) return for the same level of dollar volume traded, since the price impact will be larger.
Since the structure of the Nasdaq market is different from that of the NYSE and AMEX, we rank stocks, at the end of each quarter, on their IR measure relative to all same-market stocks. That is, Nasdaq-listed stocks are ranked against all other Nasdaq stocks, and NYSE/AMEX stocks are ranked against all other NYSE/AMEX stocks. Then, we express the ranking, ILLIQ, in percentile terms, so that the most illiquid stock receives a ranking of 100 and the most liquid receives a ranking of 1.
A.2 LDV
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) develop a model that exploits the idea that less-liquid stocks are more likely to have zero return days. Specifically, using a single-index market model for the true day t return on stock j, R jt , the measured stock return is nonzero only if the true return R * jt exceeds the trading cost (in absolute value). That is,
, where α 1j and α 2j are the trade costs of selling and buying a stock, respectively. Note that larger trade costs, α 1j and α 2j , result in a larger set of true return values over which measured returns are zero. Then, α 1j and α 2j are estimated using maximum liklihood estimation methods that assume that jt is normally distributed. The LDV measure of trading costs (or illiquidity) for stock j is then computed as (α 2j − α 1j ) /2. Since this model assumes a latent dependent variable (R * jt ), we refer to trading costs estimated using this model as LDV estimates of trading costs.
A.3 VR
Another measure we use is the variance ratios as applied in early market efficiency research. If prices are a random walk, then this implies that the ratio of long-term to short-term variances should be one. If prices are strongly mean-reverting, then long-term variance should be much lower than short-term variance.
The m-to n-day (m > n) variance ratio is defined as
where σ 2 m and σ 2 n are the volatility of daily log returns over m-and n-days, respectively. Stock prices following a random walk have an expected variance ratio of one over all values of m and n; stock prices that are mean-reverting have an expected variance ratio between zero and one. Higher levels of mean reversion in stock returns (less efficient stock prices) give lower expected values of V R mn .
APPENDIX B: Return Predictive Variables
We construct the following 24 stock characteristic variables based on data from CRSP, COMPU-STAT, and IBES. The variables are measured at the end of each quarter t. When COMPUSTAT data is involved, a variable of quarter t means a variable for the fiscal quarter reported in calendar quarter t. The reporting date is from the COMPSTAT quarterly file. If the COMPUSTAT reporting date is missing, we assume a two month time lag between fiscal quarter end and reporting date.
Value (VALUE)
1) Book-to-Market ratio (BM): book value of equity of quarter t divided by the market capitalization of common shares at end of quarter t 2) Earnings to price ratio (E/P): net income of quarter t divided by market capitalization of common shares at the end of quarter t.
3) Long term growth forecast (LTG): analyst consensus forecast for long term growth rate during last month of quarter t.
4) Sales growth (SG): Sales revenue of quarter t divided by sales revenue of quarter t-3.
Investment and Financing Activities (INVFIN)
5) Capital expenditure (CAPEX): capital expenditure during quarter t-3 to quarter t, divided by the total assets of quarter t.
6) Asset growth (AG): total assets of quarter t divided by total assets of quarter t-3. 7) Net share issues (NS): total shares outstanding at the end of quarter t divided by total shares outstanding 4 quarters ago, adjusting for stock splits.
Earnings Quality (EQAL)
8) Accruals (ACC): balance-sheet measure of accruals from quarter t-3 to quarter t, divided by the average total assets of quarter t-3 and quarter t. The balance-sheet measure of accruals is change in current assets, minus change in cash and short-term investments, minus change in current liabilities, plus change in debt in current liabilities, plus change in deferred taxes, minus depreciation.
9) Net operating assets (NOA): operating assets of quarter t minus operating liabilities of quarter t, divided by total assets of quarter t. Operating assets is total assets minus cash and short-term investments. Operating liabilities is total assets minus debt in current liabilities, long term debt, minority interests, preferred shares, and common equity.
Intangible Investments (INTANG)
10) R&D expenditure (RD): R$D expenditure of most recently reported fiscal year, divided by market cap at the end of the reported fiscal year. Annual data is used because R&D data reported in COMPUSTAT quarterly file tends to be sporadic. 11) Selling, general, and administrative expenditure (SGA): SGA expenditure of quarter t, divided by market cap at the end of quarter t. We use SGA to proxy for advertising expenditure, which is not available in the COMPUSTAT quarterly file.
Momentum (MOM)
12) Price momentum (PRRET): stock returns during the 12 months prior to the last month of quarter t.
13) Analyst forecast revision (FREV): analyst consensus EPS forecast for the currently unreported fiscal year during last month of quarter t, in excess of the consensus EPS forecast for the same fiscal year made three months ago, divided by stock price at the time the current quarter consensus forecast is measured.
14) Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE): EPS change from 4-quarter ago (i.e., EPS for quarter t minus EPS for quarter t-3), divided by the standard deviation of EPS changes from 4-quarter ago. The standard deviation is measured using EPS change of past 8 quarters, with a minimum of 4 quarters of observations required.
15) Earnings surprise (SUR):
reported EPS for quarter t minus the last consensus EPS forecast prior to earnings announcement, divided by stock price when the forecasts are measured.
Information uncertainty (UNCERT)
16) Return standard deviation (STDR): standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. 17) Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL): standard deviation of residuals from regressing daily stock returns during quarter t onto daily market returns and 3 lags of market returns. CRSP valueweighted index is used as proxy for the market.
18) Analyst forecast dispersion (DISP): the cross-sectional standard deviation of EPS forecast for the currently unreported fiscal year, made during month m, divided by the stock price measured at the time of forecast.
Profitability (PROF)
19) Return on assets (ROA): net income of quarter t divided by the total assets at beginning of quarter t. 20) Change in return on assets (DROA): ROA of quarter t minus ROA of quarter t-3.
Liquidity (LIQ)
21) Size (SIZE): log market capitalization at end of quarter t. 22) Trading turnover (TURN): average monthly trading volume during quarter t divided by total shares outstanding at end of quarter t.
23) Dollar turnover: (DTURN): average monthly dollar trading volume (shares traded multipled by month-end stock price) during quarter t divided by total shares outstanding at end of quarter t.
24) Amihud illiquidity ratio (AMIHUD): the absolute daily return divided by the dollar amount of trading (number of shares traded multiplied by end-of-day stock price), averaged over quarter t. A minimum of 44 daily observations are required.
After constructing the 24 characteristic variables, we take the following steps to convert them into 8 predictors.
First, we adjust the sign of each variable so that variables of similar nature are in the same direction. For example, a high value of TURN is an indication of liquidity, while a high value of AMIHUD is an indication of illiquidity. So is the relationship between EP and SG. To make these variables consistent with each other, we add a negative sign in front of the following variables: LTG, SG, CAPEX, AG, NS, ACC, NOA, STDR, IVOL, DISP, TURN, DTURN. After adjusting the signs, all the variables are expected to be positively correlated with stock returns during the subsequent quarter, based on evidence from existing literature.
Second, in each quarter we cross-sectionally rank all 18 signed variables into percentiles to make them comparable. For the two variables involving trading volume -TURN, DTURN, and AMIHUD, since NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ report trading volume differently, we rank stocks mainly traded on NYSE/AMEX separately from those traded on NASDAQ.
Third, we combine 18 variables into 8 characteristic measures by taking the average of the percentile ranks. Specifically, VALUE is the average of percentile ranks of BM, EP, -LTG, -SG. INVFIN is the average percentile ranks of -CAPEX, -AG, and -NS. EQAL is the average percentile ranks of -ACC and -NOA. INTANG is the average percentile ranks of RND and SGA. MOM is the average of percentile ranks of PRRET, FREV, SUE, and SUR. UNCTN is the average percentile ranks of -STDR, -IVOL and -DISP. PROF is the percentile rank of ROA and DROA. Finally, LIQ is the average percentile ranks of -TURN, -DTURN, and AMIHUD. The negative signs in front of the variables indicate that we have changed the signs of these variables in the first step.
If any of the 24 variables is missing, it is not used to compute the corresponding characteristic measure. We require a minimum of 12 non-missing characteristic variables for a stock to be included in our sample. If any of the resulting 8 predictors is still missing, we replace it with the crosssectional mean (across all valid stocks during the quarter t). However, if more than four resulting characteristic measures are missing the stock is excluded from the sample. |net $trades|/total $trades is the absolute value of net purchase by all passive or active funds on a stock during the current quarter and the previous quarter, divided by the total purchase plus total sale, over the current quarter and the prior quarter. |net #trades|/total #trades is the absolute value of net number of funds purchasing a stock during the current quarter and the previous quarter, divided by the total number of funds trading on the stock, over the current quarter and the prior quarter. In each quarter, we calculate these measures on each individual stock, for passive funds and for active funds separately, and then average them across stocks. Their time series means over the sample years from 1993 to 2006, and the corresponding t-statistics (in parenthesis) are reported. Passive-Active is the difference of the synchronicity measures between the passive funds and active funds. This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that examine the effect of passive and active funds on return-predictive power of firm characteristics. In each regression, the dependent variable is stock return during one of the subsequent four quarters (RETQ1 to RETQ4). The main explanatory variables include X, one of the eight stock return predictors, and two product terms X*ACTIVE and X*PASSIVE, where, ACTIVE is the cross-sectional rank of the activeness measure ACTIVEHOLD, and PASSIVE is the cross-sectional rank of the corresponding passiveness measure PASSIVEHOLD. The return-predictors (X) are, respectively, value (VALUE), investment and financing activities (INVFIN), earnings quality (EQAL), intangible investments (INTANG), momentum (MOM), uncertainty (UNCERT), profitability (PROF), and liquidity (LIQ). These predictive variables are signed so that their correlations with next-quarter stock returns, according to existing literature, are positive. In addition, we include two control variables X*SIZE and X*TURN, where SIZE is the log market cap and TURN is the exchange-specific cross-sectional percentile rank of trading turnover. The cross-sectional regressions are performed in each quarter from 1993 to 2006. The explanatory variables are lagged by one to four quarters and in each quarter we take the averages of the coefficients across the four regressions (i.e., the "JT-Average" coefficient). Reported are the time series means and the corresponding t-statistics (in parenthesis) of the estimated quarterly-average coefficients. Regression intercept is not reported. Coefficients in the table are all multiplied by 100. 
